










































A 'wall of ideas': the taboo on tenderness in theory and culture
Citation for published version:
Miller, G 2008, 'A 'wall of ideas': the taboo on tenderness in theory and culture' New Literary
History, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 667-81. DOI: 10.1353/nlh.2008.0010
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1353/nlh.2008.0010
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:





© Miller, G. (2008). "A 'wall of ideas': the taboo on tenderness in theory and culture". New Literary History, 38(4),
667-81. 10.1353/nlh.2008.0010
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
A Wall of Ideas: The "Taboo on Tenderness" in Theory and Culture
Gavin Miller
New Literary History, Volume 38, Number 4, Autumn 2007, pp. 667-681
(Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/nlh.2008.0010
For additional information about this article
                                                  Access provided by University of Edinburgh (20 Feb 2014 10:09 GMT)
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nlh/summary/v038/38.4miller.html
New Literary History, 2007, 38: 667–681
A Wall of Ideas: The “Taboo on  
Tenderness” in Theory and Culture*
Gavin Miller
Reductive accounts of love are commonplace in academic discourse; the “hermeneutics of suspicion,” to use Paul Ricoeur’s phrase, are readily applied to this emotion. Such accounts are, I 
believe, symptomatic of a “taboo on tenderness” that affects our culture 
and distorts our thinking, so that a “wall of ideas” interposes between us 
and the reality of love. The concept of a “taboo on tenderness” I derive 
from the work of the psychiatrist Ian Suttie (1889–1935), whose 1935 
classic, The Origins of Love and Hate, argues that a repression of tender 
feeling is endemic at all levels of cultural life. The taboo on tenderness 
limits manifestations of love and affection, and rationalizes away those 
sentiments that do manage to find expression. 
To restore or repair the reality of tender feeling, as Suttie counsels, is 
to open up new areas of cultural and textual interpretation. Is there a 
gendered dimension to the taboo on tenderness? When did tenderness 
become tabooed, and how is this process visible in culture? Could this 
repression in part explain the sentimentality of popular culture as a 
form of commodified gratification? Did our contemporary, and perhaps 
masculine, obsession with sex arise because tenderness is still permissible 
in contexts of sexual intimacy? These are some of the cultural questions 
that the concept discloses. The idea of a taboo on tenderness also invites 
reflection on our favoured hermeneutics of suspicion. Why—despite 
enormous empirical evidence to the contrary—has psychoanalytic theory 
in the humanities become fixated upon an account of the earliest stages 
of human life as selfish, hedonistic, and solipsistic? How can we explain 
this preference for a “tough-minded,” unsentimental—and thus, unreal-
istic—psychoanalytic theory?
I am far from the only critic to voice some suspicion of suspicion. 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has argued that “what Paul Ricoeur memorably 
* Earlier versions of this article were given as part of the visiting-speaker programs in 
the Research Institute of Irish and Scottish Studies, University of Aberdeen, and in the 
Department of English Literature, University of Edinburgh. My particular thanks for their 
interest and comments go to Cairns Craig and Chris Fynsk.
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called the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ . . . may have had an unintention-
ally stultifying side-effect.”1 Much as Cartesian philosophy trusted to a 
procedure of systematic doubt, so modern literary critics seem to have 
put their faith in a program of wholesale suspicion that is paradoxically 
“trusting about the effects of exposure” (PR 17). Sedgwick invokes Melanie 
Klein’s object relations psychoanalysis to explain, or at least to character-
ize, this academic norm. The hermeneutics of suspicion, she argues, are 
mandated by a customary adoption of the Kleinian paranoid-schizoid 
position, which perceives in the world the unconscious projections of 
dissociated rage, and so is always in a condition of “terrible alertness” 
to potential danger (PR 8). Against this condition of perpetual psychic 
readiness, Sedgwick opposes the “reparative” possibilities of the depres-
sive position. A reparative reading will “assemble and confer plenitude 
on an object that will then have resources to offer to an inchoate self” 
(PR 28); it may thereby offer the possibility of a pleasant surprise in the 
text, rather than the wearying confirmation of one’s worst suspicions.
Segdwick’s theory is not one that this essay wholeheartedly endorses. 
Kleinian object relations psychoanalysis is, in fact, one of the theories that 
it opposes, since Klein claims that our earliest relations are not innately 
directed to persons (“objects,” in psychoanalytic jargon), but to bits and 
pieces of persons (“part objects,” primarily the breast). Sedgwick needs 
also, I believe, to justify and explain the apparent analogy in her text 
between the psychoanalytic object and the textual objects of paranoid 
and reparative readings. Yet the general spirit of Sedgwick’s argument 
is consonant with my more limited attempt to “repair” the reading of 
tender feeling.
Such reparative work has already begun upon romantic love (“falling 
in love” with another), if not upon the more mundane love and affec-
tion (simply “loving” another) with which this essay is concerned. The 
hermeneutics of suspicion have been applied quite readily to romantic 
love, which is at the center of various social and economic practices. Mary 
Evans can claim, for instance “that people in the West have suffered more 
in their personal lives from ‘love’ than from any other single ideology.”2 
In implicit opposition to Evans is the more charitable interpretation of 
Charles Lindholm, who questions the various hermeneutics of suspicion 
that are brought to bear upon the phenomenon: “ethnographic mate-
rial demonstrates that romantic love is not necessarily the prerogative 
of a leisured class; it does not require a complex society; it is not solely 
heterosexual, nor does it always lead to marriage; it is not intrinsically 
linked to capitalism, small families, sexual oppression, a cult of mother-
hood or a quest for identity; it is neither a disguise for lust nor evidence 
of evolution at work. Rather, romantic attraction . . . is experientially 
akin to the experience of religious ecstasy.”3 If romantic love can be ap-
669a wall of ideas
proached, as Lindholm has it, “on its own terms,” taking at face value 
medieval courtly love or the Victorian division between sex and romantic 
love,4 then so can the tender love that may subsist during the ecstasies 
of romance, and persist after they have dwindled. Tender, affectionate, 
companionate love requires its own reparative reading.
Such a reading cannot employ, however, the dominant modes of psy-
choanalytic theory in the humanities. Although psychoanalytic theory 
has changed significantly in the decades since Suttie’s contribution in The 
Origins of Love and Hate, his argument still holds true, mutatis mutandis. 
The Freudian model of love as aim-inhibited sexuality has receded, but 
replacements have been found, such as the Lacanian development of 
Freud’s ideas. Tender feeling is still intellectually tabooed, yet with even 
less rational excuse than in Suttie’s time—for there is now a significant 
amount of empirical research on infant development that challenges 
psychoanalytically reductive explanations of love. The currently dominant 
psychoanalytic theories in the humanities tend, however, to ignore such 
work, and focus instead on what Daniel Stern calls the “clinical infant,” a 
construction of therapeutic practice “made up of memories, present reen-
actments in the transference, and theoretically guided interpretations.”5 
Clearly, the clinical infant may be an effective tool in therapy, but quite 
inaccurate as a guide to the reality of early life—particularly since this 
construct emerges out of psychopathological rather than normal adult 
experience. Yet, the potential factual inaccuracy of such psychoanalytic 
models may be forgotten, and the fantasies, pseudomemories, and sym-
bolizations of neurotic patients treated as if they were the introspective 
reports that an infant would give, had it the capacity. But if psychoanalytic 
theory in the humanities is willing to have any dealings with real infants, 
then it will have to adopt a very different conception of the child’s early 
existence and, consequently, a very different idea of the repressions and 
sublimations that may be apparent in cultural readings. Nancy Easterlin 
argues by reference to the work of developmental psychologists such as 
Stern, John Bowlby, Colwyn Trevarthen, and others, that the dominant 
psychoanalytic account of the earliest phases of existence as solipsistic, 
narcissistic, and autistic has been profoundly challenged by empirical 
studies. The child is, in fact, attached to the mother because of a primal 
feeling of love, rather than because of the Freudian supposition of a 
“secondary drive derived from a sexualized primary drive for food.”6 Nor 
is there any stage at which the child is unable to distinguish itself from 
the other: “the conclusion of contemporary developmentalists [is] that 
Freud’s belief in primary narcissism is fundamentally wrong.”7
Easterlin contrasts the work of developmental psychology with that 
of psychoanalysis, and tends to present the former as more empirically 
aware. There is, however, a significant psychoanalytic tradition that 
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recognizes that the child’s primary relation to the mother is one of 
love and companionship, rather than conflict and mastery, and that is 
less insistent on the hypothesis of primary narcissism. The “object rela-
tions” theories of W. R. D. Fairbairn (1889–1964) and successors such 
as Harry Guntrip (1901–75) and J. D. Sutherland (1905–91) belong to 
this tradition, as does the work of Suttie, who may be regarded as its 
founder. According to Peter Rudnytsky, “In assessing both the historical 
unfolding and the theoretical achievement of object relations thought, 
special mention must be made of Ian Suttie’s Origins of Love and Hate. 
This book . . . contains the kernel of virtually every idea elaborated 
by subsequent analysts.”8 Suttie’s ideas are, as Daniel Burston notes, 
central to a psychoanalysis with an entirely different conception of hu-
man sociability: “Suttie sharply criticized Freud’s patriarchalism, and 
. . . championed the primary sociability of the human animal. Unlike 
[Wilhelm] Reich, but like [Otto] Gross and [Erich] Fromm, and later 
R. D. Laing, Suttie asserted that Freud’s psychopathology inverted the 
real causal nexus in human development, that is, that perversions and 
anti-social behavior were due to deformations of our innate sociability, 
rather than sociability deriving from a supposedly sexual source via 
sublimation.”9 It is therefore too hasty to argue with Easterlin that “the 
durability of the psychoanalytic paradigm in literary studies attests to an 
abiding sexism in our general culture which replaces the positive fact of 
nurture with a primarily destructive dynamic.”10 There is certainly some 
kind of contemporary cultural problem that makes it hard to talk about 
love between mother and child (and indeed between anybody else). But 
psychoanalytic criticism per se need not be founded on a patriarchal 
suppression of nurturance.
As Burston’s comment indicates, Freud’s theory of society is to Suttie 
an enormous conceptual construction aimed at denying the primary 
reality of love or any other social interest. Freud has what Suttie calls a 
“fallacious metaphysical starting-point”—namely, the idea that “we can 
speculate upon the ‘origin of society’ as if this were an historical event” 
and somehow arrive at empirically valid conclusions.11 Instead, says Sut-
tie, we will only display “how and why we imagine we would unite into a 
group if we were these ‘mythical monsters,’ independent individuals” 
(90). Once we abandon this starting point, Suttie points out, we no 
longer have to explain how apparent altruism can be resolved into ego-
ism, and a hedonistic egoism at that. In fact, says Suttie—anticipating 
Bowlby, Trevarthen, Stern, and others—the weight of the ethological, 
evolutionary, and general psychological evidence points to the existence 
of a primary social interest in human beings: “Instead of an armament 
of instincts—latent or otherwise—which would lead it to attempt on its 
own account things impossible to its powers or even undesirable—[the 
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child] is born with a simple attachment-to-mother who is the sole source 
of food and protection” (12). 
With this theory comes a revised view of the instincts, and of the 
pleasure that attends their gratification. To Suttie, instinctual gratifica-
tion is not primarily an end in itself; whether in adult or infantile love, 
“the emotions borrow, as it were, the use of organs . . . and turn them 
temporarily to purposes that are definitely social” (68). This account of 
the instincts as a medium for social relationships is echoed, to an extent 
independently, by Fairbairn’s contemporaneous object relations theory. 
Conventional Freudian psychoanalysis is mistaken, argues Fairbairn, in its 
understanding of the relationship between infantile libido and its “object.” 
The other person, or “object,” is not a means to libidinal satisfaction; 
rather, the libido is a means by which to establish a relationship with 
the object: “the function of libidinal pleasure is essentially to provide a 
sign-post to the object. According to the conception of erotogenic zones 
the object is regarded as a sign-post to libidinal pleasure; and the cart is 
thus placed before the horse.”12 The child, says Fairbairn, requires the 
mother to provide instinctual gratification and comfort not because it is 
motivated by hedonism, but because such attentions provide confirma-
tion of the mother’s loving personal presence.
It is important to distinguish a psychoanalytic theory such as Suttie’s or 
Fairbairn’s from those in which loving personal relations are derivative 
or secondary. Lacan’s theory, which dominates psychoanalytic discourse 
in the humanities, might easily be misread as a properly interpersonal 
theory. Lacan frequently appears to say that satisfaction of the infant’s 
biological needs is a signpost by which the mother demonstrates her love 
for the child, and so establishes a personal relation: “Demand constitutes 
the Other as already possessing the ‘privilege’ of satisfying needs. . . . 
In this way demand annuls the particularity of everything that can be 
granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions 
that it obtains for need are reduced to the level of being no more than 
the crushing of the demand for love.”13 But the theories are not really 
so similar. In Lacan’s scheme of things, “love” is demanded because 
the infant wants to abolish the other and return to a state of primitive 
omnipotent wholeness, with no self/other distinction, no “lack,” and 
hence no anxieties about the satisfaction of its needs. This state of nature 
is the “Real,” a condition in which, according to Jacqueline Rose, “the 
child forms a syncretic unity with the mother, and cannot distinguish 
between itself and its environment. It has no awareness of its own corpo-
real boundaries. It is ubiquitous.”14 The “Lack” of the Real, and a wish to 
return to it, are what lie behind love relations in Lacanian theory. Rose 
explains: “The child wants everything, an impossible plenitude; it wants 
to be filled by the other, to be the other, which is why no determinate 
new literary history672
thing will do. . . . [I]t demands a fullness of the other to stop up the 
lack that conditions its existence as a subject” (62).
Rather than following the instincts and their vicissitudes, Lacanian 
theory traces our alleged negotiation with the constitutive lack in human 
being. But it is still recognizably constructed upon the Freudian hypoth-
esis of primary narcissism, an autistic condition upon which relations to 
the external world and real others are imposed. Indeed, the obstinacy 
of this hypothesis is indicated by its appearance even in the object rela-
tions feminism that challenged Lacanian theory. Nancy Chodorow, for 
instance, does not oppose the hypothesis of primary fusion. Instead, she 
criticizes Lacanian theory for its assertion that “there can be no subjectivity 
apart from schematized sexual identity: gender difference is all there is 
when it comes to our selfhood and subjectivity.”15 The thesis of primary 
narcissism therefore remains intact in Chodorow’s work: “Psychoanalysis 
talks of the process of ‘differentiation’ or ‘separation-individuation.’ A 
child of either gender is born originally with what is called a ‘narcissis-
tic relation to reality’: cognitively and libidinally it experiences itself as 
merged and continuous with the world in general, and with its mother or 
caretaker in particular” (102). In this model, as in Lacan’s, recognition 
of the other interrupts an original condition in which there are neither 
external objects, nor other minds, nor indeed an ego distinguishable 
from them. Thus, as Easterlin concludes, although feminist theorists such 
as Chodorow “astutely note masculine bias in psychoanalytical models, 
they locate that bias in the misapplication of the Oedipus complex to 
girls and women, never questioning the validity of Freud’s notion of 
sexualized primary attachment and individuation.”16
This continuity between Freudian ideas, Lacanian theory, and certain 
strands of object relations psychoanalysis opens them to the kind of objec-
tions posed by models that hypothesize a primary intersubjectivity. Firstly, 
is there indeed an autistic condition of primary narcissism? Secondly, 
even if there were such a condition, why should its coming to an end 
be experienced as a lack? There is no a priori reason why either thesis 
should hold true. As to the first, Stern points out that “primary fusion 
was a pathomorphic retrospective, secondary conceptualization”: in other 
words, because adult patients displayed psychopathologies marked by “the 
wish for merger and the fear of engulfment,” it was assumed that this 
was indicative of an earlier phase in mental life.17 Stern, however, flatly 
denies this solipsistic or “autistic” thesis: “There is no confusion between 
self and other in the beginning or at any point during infancy. [Infants] 
are also predesigned to be selectively responsive to external social events 
and never experience an autistic-like phase.”18 Such empirical research is 
an obvious challenge to any psychoanalysis that assumes that the infant’s 
initial love of the mother is essentially a desperate striving to return to 
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the “Real.” To such research, we might add a conceptual problem with 
the Lacanian thesis that a “mirror stage” can somehow explain the end 
of a hypothetical primary narcissism (supplementing, as it were, real 
birth with an act of psychic parturition). Raymond Tallis points out that, 
in order to recognize itself in the mirror, the infant must already have a 
sense of itself as separate: “Lacan begins with the assumption/observation 
that the child can recognise his own face in the mirror. . . . He does not 
wonder what ‘own’ can mean here where there is no formed conception 
of the self as being opposed to other human and material objects.”19 
The second Lacanian assumption, that of “Lack,” is also problematic. 
Even if there were a state of imagined ubiquity, why should its coming 
to an end be experienced as a loss or deprivation, instead of the gaining 
of companionship with the mother? Rather than being thought of as a 
little boy or girl looking for mommy or daddy, the infant is conceived 
along the lines of a Romantic philosopher or artist, and imbued with the 
spirit of German Idealism. The Freudian-Lacanian baby is Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, disturbed from its opium dream by a social and interpersonal 
reality no more welcome than the latter’s “person on business from Por-
lock.”20 But while poets (and academics) may find others a troublesome 
interruption to their dreams of self-sufficiency and creativity, we might 
think twice before assuming that this holds true for infants.
Part of what makes Suttie’s work so important is his response to these 
mythologies of the “clinical infant.” Although Suttie is to some extent 
caught up in the assumption of an original Oneness without Lack, he 
directly challenges Freudian theory (and, avant la lettre, Lacanian theory), 
by arguing that the recognition of others cannot be regarded as primarily 
a loss or a threat: “The love of others comes into being simultaneously 
with the recognition of their existence.”21 The reason, says Suttie, that we are so 
infatuated with an agonistic account of the mother-child relation is that we 
are possessed by the taboo on tenderness. Suttie’s account of this taboo 
means that his work has remained strikingly important, not just for psy-
choanalysis, but for contemporary cultural interpretation. For, although 
the behavioral sciences have picked up and enthusiastically developed 
Suttie’s ideas, the human sciences have remained in a kind of stasis. In 
literary criticism, it is almost as if the “relational turn” in psychoanalytic 
theory had never occurred: love and tenderness are treated as mere sen-
timentality, and dissolved by an unwarranted hermeneutic of suspicion. 
A typical example of such contemporary reductiveness can be found in 
an essay by Linda Williams on the history of Hollywood screen kisses: 
“all screen kisses,” Williams claims, “share in a connection to infantile 
sexuality born of hunger and derived from the original oral gratification 
of sucking, in effect, of eating (or drinking) the other.”22 The enjoyment 
of kissing, whether it be a direct prelude to intercourse, or “perversely” 
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prolonged, is in its connection, as a substitute, to an unconscious erotic 
fantasy of incorporating the (m)other: “the kiss,” says Williams, “is a 
kind of aim-inhibited eating” (321). The kiss is not a meeting of two 
persons, but an echo of an archaic desire for oneness—for Freudian 
primary narcissism, or the Lacanian Real. The possibility of a kiss that is 
not derived from some aim-inhibited striving seems to disappear entirely 
from Williams’s analysis. What emerges instead is a quasi-physiological 
vocabulary: “the kiss is a first act of sexual intimacy in which two bodies 
join; the mouths prefigure the later joining of other body parts.” This 
impersonal terminology is also apparent in Williams’s claim that suckling, 
which kissing supposedly recalls, is not an early social relationship, but 
rather an act “in which one erotogenic zone—the mother’s nipple—ex-
cites another—the infant’s mouth” (312).
Williams’s article is typical of many in the humanities in that it regards 
affection as the expression of some aim-inhibited Freudian or Lacanian 
striving. But once this intellectual fixation is abandoned, and tender-
ness “repaired”—as I believe it should be—then it is possible to employ 
a quite different hermeneutic of suspicion, one that seeks out inhibited 
tenderness, rather than repressed quasi-erotic impulses. I want, then, to 
develop the hypothesis first suggested by Suttie: namely, that it is pos-
sible to understand our popular, aesthetic, and intellectual culture as 
formed by a masculine repression of tender feeling. The masculinity of 
the “taboo on tenderness” is frequently implied by Suttie, who regards 
“manliness” as paradigmatic of suppressed nonsexual love. “Little boys 
when grown up and ‘civilized,’” he observes, “have no less inhibition in 
expressing and embarrassment in receiving cordial regard. Sentiment 
makes them ‘squirm.’ ‘It is simply not done.’ It is ‘wet.’”23 If Suttie’s 
account is correct, then it may be possible to explain the development 
of the taboo on tenderness as a historical process of cultural “masculin-
ization.” Although there may be many possible starting points for such 
a history, the late eighteenth century in particular would seem to be a 
crucial era of attack on the sentimental in literature, art, and manners 
in general. Loins were being girded for national war, and even for revo-
lutionary action, so the teary-eyed compassion depicted as an exemplar 
of conduct in Henry MacKenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771) was attacked 
from both sides as infantile and unmanly. For conservatives, “sensibility 
was felt to be demoralizing, anti-Christian and childishly French”; and 
for radicals, “pathos and effusions were no remedy for poverty and in-
justice.”24 In this characterization of sentiment as debilitating, the baby 
of tenderness tended to be thrown out with the bathwater of fashionable 
sentimentality. The love between mother and child could even be seen 
as a prototype of particularistic and overindulgent relations—as Mary 
Wollstonecraft has it, “women who . . . idolize their children, seldom 
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show common humanity to servants, or feel the least tenderness for any 
children but their own.”25
Indeed, there soon arose a culture that saw maternal tenderness to 
infants as unnecessary. Katie Trumpener shows how the division of la-
bor during child-rearing in the late eighteenth century led to anxieties 
about the cultural consequences of wet-nursing: the nursling was, in 
effect, being brought up in a lower social class.26 In order to repress 
their anxieties about this dual socialization, the middle classes invented 
a mythical infant, one whose relation to its nurse was entirely nutritive: 
“bourgeois mothers . . . try to restrict the nurse’s role in the household, 
instituting a class divide between mind and body. They themselves are to 
guard their children’s souls, train their minds, and fill their mouths with 
(well-pronounced) words; the nurses merely will care for the children’s 
bodies, filling their mouths with food and milk” (BN 197). Freud, for 
Trumpener, is someone caught up in this bourgeois fantasy as it contin-
ues into the nineteenth century, and this is precisely what underlies the 
invisibility of the nurse in his work: “his theories of infantile amnesia and 
the Oedipal complex transform the nurse into a figure of anachronism, 
. . . quite without psychoanalytic interest” (BN 200). The model of social 
relations postulated in Freudian (and, we might add, Lacanian) theory 
is based on a repression of the matriarchal love relationship established 
by physical care and proximity (that is, “tenderness”), and an exag-
geration of the socializing impact of moral and linguistic development. 
Trumpener’s history may help to explain why the Freudian model thinks 
unthinkingly of socialization as patriarchal repression and training, rather 
than as the cultivation of a common life that is present ab ovo between 
mother and child.
The masculinization of cultural ideals, and an ejection of the infantile 
and unmanly phenomena associated with tenderness, may also help to 
explain the aesthetic philosophy that begins with Kant and that relegates 
sentimental response to the “lower” cultural forms. The enduring associa-
tion of sentimental response with a lack of cultural capital has received 
the philosophical attentions of Robert C. Solomon, who echoes Suttie 
(unknowingly) in arguing that “soppy” emotions are generally subject 
to taboo: “For too many people, . . . overt sentiment is excessive. Such 
emotions are themselves embarrassing.”27 The high-cultural disdain for 
sentimental literature is based, believes Solomon, upon a mistaken Kan-
tian opposition between rational autonomy and emotional (or, at least, 
sentimental) heteronomy in which the reader is feminized and “violated” 
by the text: “The author . . . is something of a seducer, though the fruits 
of a successful seduction may be only a tear or two. Sentimental litera-
ture violates the reader’s sense of self by provoking these unwelcome 
emotional intrusions at an intensity that cannot be controlled” (9). The 
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disdain for sentimental literature, of course, ignores the frequently sig-
nificant political power of sentiment in literature—Solomon’s example 
is the impact on U.S. history of Uncle Tom’s Cabin.28
The grotesque and easily caricatured forms of Victorian popular senti-
ment would seem, then, to be a reaction against this masculine aesthetic 
and cultural ideal. As tenderness and affection were exiled from adult 
life, so cultural representations had to make up for this absence with the 
most regressive, “intrusive,” and mechanically poignant of motifs. It is 
notable, though, that the mechanisms of popular art thereby preserved 
a consciousness of the tenderness that could not be had in everyday 
life. Consider the Victorian parlor song: in the words of Maurice Will-
son Disher, “Flowers had to wither, hearts had to be shattered, birds 
to fall with broken wings, children to be orphaned, orphans to starve, 
chairs to be left empty, and sailors to drown, whenever they were the 
subjects of Victorian song.”29 The tender love of the mother, naturally 
enough, was a useful motif: “A boy’s best friend is his mother” runs one 
Victorian parlor song; “For us her loving sympathy will plead!”30 By the 
late twentieth century, however, even such culturally commodified love 
between mother and son is an object of hermeneutic suspicion because 
of the expert knowledge that says that such tenderness is a pathology 
enjoyed only by the “mummy’s boy.” “A boy’s best friend is his mother,” 
says—or quotes—Norman Bates to Marion Crane in Psycho. Bates, a man 
who took to heart the song’s advice to “cherish her with care, / And 
smooth her silv’ry hair,”31 “proves” what we all now “know,” from the 
denouement of this film if from nothing else: such tender sentiment can 
conceal only a fantastic longing for a regressive and sexualized narcis-
sistic identification.32
My readings so far have concentrated on the taboo on tenderness be-
tween mother and child. But this concept also helps to explain why the 
modernist focus on interior life did not bring forth reparative readings of 
tenderness between adults. The problem lies not so much with what the 
modernists depicted, as with us, their current readers. We are formed in 
the main by postwar “sexual liberation,” that blend of popular culture, 
modernist sensibility, and sexology that helped to legitimate “sexuality” 
and to challenge Victorian hypocrisy: “Sexual intercourse began / In 
nineteen sixty-three”—says Philip Larkin in “Annus Mirabilis”—“Between 
the end of the Chatterley ban / And the Beatles’ first LP.”33 But this cultural 
shift worked in many ways to further repress tenderness. Mark Spilka, 
drawing in part upon the work of Suttie, discusses what may be the more 
truly revolutionary agenda of Lawrence’s banned novel: “Tenderness was his 
first title for Lady Chatterley’s Lover, and courage for it his lasting theme.” 
The impersonal, ego-dissolving forces of sexual passion take a backseat in 
Lady Chatterley’s Lover, a text that represents sex as only one among the 
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many manifestations of loving tenderness: “sex itself is only the closest 
touch, the closest form of natural communion.”34 So, although the ban 
on Lady Chatterley’s Lover was lifted in 1960, it was in a way safe to do 
so. By that time, heterosexual love was equally caught up in the taboo 
that had already repressed same-sex tenderness by channeling love into 
sexuality. Lillian Faderman has provided one of the keenest accounts of 
this process at work in love relations between women: “From the 1920s 
on when women loved other women, they were forced to examine their 
sexual motives; and where none existed that were powerful enough to act 
on before, in a climate which insisted that humans are sexual or they are 
repressed, it is likely that many who sought such motives found them.”35 
Modernist literature briefly dared to show the nonsexual love that dare 
not speak its name, but almost simultaneously there arose a generation 
of readers (and often writers) psychoanalytically trained to interpret 
love as the aim-inhibited expression of some more hedonistic, egoistic, 
or solipsistic striving. Following Suttie, this interpretative blindness can 
again be viewed as an aspect of cultural “masculinity.” Suttie uses his own 
hermeneutic of suspicion to argue that sex itself is one of the favored 
masculine covers for surreptitious tenderness. “I would say,” he comments, 
“that men have substituted sex for intimacy.” Sexualized love allows an 
acceptable, if narrowed, outlet for impulses of sentimentality—dazzled 
by the hedonism of sexual congress, we overlook the concomitant ex-
pressions of tender emotions: “we excuse tenderness or sentimentality 
. . . on the grounds of its sexual intention and tendencies.”36 Suttie therefore 
anticipates the contemporary observation that the primacy of sex in our 
culture may be related to its acceptability as an outlet for more deeply 
proscribed emotions.37
Sex, for Suttie, is among the many indirect or otherwise latent ways in 
which adult men may indulge their tabooed tender feelings. Affectionate 
teasing, the keeping of pet animals, paid (and therefore economically 
rationalized) caring relationships such as psychiatry, and the formation 
of ostensibly “practical” societies and brotherhoods are some of the 
other examples that he gives of latent tenderness. We might add that 
the capitalist market is also among the pseudosolutions to the taboo on 
tenderness, as is readily apparent in the cultural commodities that inherit 
Victorian sentimentalism—such as women’s romance literature (often 
considered a pornography of the emotions) and the tear-jerking movie, 
typified by the lachrymal engineering apparent in Arthur Hiller’s Love 
Story (1970), or, at a higher level of art, by Walt Disney’s Bambi (1942). 
A further index of how far this commodification has progressed may 
be found in the way that even nonsexual touch has been commodified. 
Touch has been increasingly regulated in everyday life, particularly 
because of anxieties around sexual harassment and abuse. It has there-
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fore been forced into regulated, and sometimes even professionalized, 
domains. The U.S. fad for “Cuddle Parties,” which was widely reported 
in 2005, illustrates this process at work. The originators of this peculiar 
practice intellectually acknowledge both the taboo on tenderness and 
the existence of surreptitious outlets for touch and intimacy. In public-
spirited fashion, they offer their services as a safe and efficient way of 
getting “our Recommended Daily Allowance of welcomed touch”: “For 
many people, the only options for getting their touch needs met consist 
of paying for a massage, having a drunken hookup or getting a pat-down 
from airport security. Cuddle Parties seek to change that in a way that’s 
conscious, healthy and nutritious.”38 For around thirty dollars, partici-
pants can join ten to twenty other adults in a mass cuddling session, 
and then later buy a t-shirt, coffee mug, or even be trained as a Cuddle 
Party facilitator (at around $1000 for a weekend course). Tenderness is 
permitted for those who can afford it as a professionalized compensation 
for a “tough” working environment.
Such phenomena are not usually subject to Marxist analysis because 
critics in this school have been invited by certain psychoanalytic think-
ers to reduce love to reciprocal excitation, the joining of bodies, the 
inhibition of instincts, and a repressed striving for merger. Yet it is 
notable that, like “Cuddle Parties,” kittens in baskets, and Bambi, Freud-
ian-Lacanian theory seems itself to involve a compensation for tabooed 
tenderness. In a culture that conceives of communion as an aggregation 
of social atoms, fellowship can only be expressed as the subsistence of 
each individual in the reality of a single indivisible being—in one big 
atom, the monistic Lacanian Real, rather than in lots and lots of lit-
tle ones. The Real, I suggest, should be thought of as a cousin to the 
equally insubstantial concept of the “orgone” developed by the radical 
psychoanalyst Wilhelm Reich. According to Reich, this universal energy 
permeates the material and organic worlds, and is stored in the tense 
muscles of the sexually repressed. Yet Reich, while trying to be rigorously 
“materialist” by reducing psychic life to the discharge of tension, finds 
himself unconvinced by the narcissistic infant of Freudian theory: “the 
contention of the psychoanalysts of the autistic character of the baby is 
an artefact. . . . The baby . . . , if it is not understood emotionally in a 
simple manner and responded to, has to shut itself in.” But rather than 
abandon the hardnosed masculine construction of a libidinal economics-
cum-hydraulics, Reich turns to the all-encompassing orgone as the reality 
that underlies the apparent tender sympathy that exists between him and 
his son: “It took me several weeks to learn to understand what the boy 
wanted when he cried. I did not apply any scientific knowledge—the 
more I did so, the less I succeeded. The only thing that worked was 
identifying myself with his expression and then I knew what he wanted. 
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What psychoanalysis calls identification seems to be rooted very deeply 
in what I might call the contact of the orgonotic system of a grown-up 
with that of the baby.”39 The “orgone” energy, like the Lacanian Real, is 
the pseudoscientific monism that Reich produces in order to vindicate 
theoretically his opposition to the atomism of Freudian metapsychology. 
Through it, we perceive what is truly tabooed: the tender love between 
parent and child.
These are, then, some of the many intriguing avenues of inquiry sug-
gested by the idea of a taboo on tenderness. The concept is immensely 
valuable for contemporary critical thought because it employs fruitfully 
a psychoanalytic hermeneutic of suspicion, yet it does so without simply 
dismissing empirical psychology. It therefore groups together various 
phenomena that very much resist Freudian or Lacanian reading, but that 
invite psychoanalytic conceptualization as evidence of a cultural “mascu-
linity” that represses tenderness. The attack on sensibility, Trumpener’s 
reading of the wet nurse as “repressed,” the displacement of sentiment 
to popular culture, the blindness and insight found in the reading of 
Lawrence’s work, the commodification of touch and tender feeling, 
and the monistic fantasies of psychoanalytic theory—all can be seen as 
aspects of the same phenomenon. The concept also invites synthesis with 
other, nonpsychoanalytic theories. Foucault’s account of how “sexuality” 
operates productively, enforcing “sexual identities” and “expression,” 
complements the repression of tenderness: the more sex is at the root 
of things, the less we allow ourselves nonsexual companionship and 
feeling. Marxist readings, too, can combine fruitfully with the paradigm: 
sentiment, like sex, seems to be commodified and consumed, and so 
presumably can be analyzed in a similar way.
The cultural masculinity that I have noted is, of course, an institu-
tional obstacle to the further development of such an analysis: Solomon 
remarks, “In the history of philosophy and—especially—in the academic 
machismo of the contemporary university, sensitivity is too often consid-
ered a vice rather than a virtue and dismissed as mere ‘sentimentality.’”40 
Such “academic machismo” is readily apparent in the intellectual habit, 
or compulsion, by which psychoanalytic theory in the humanities takes 
for granted an original autistic, selfish, and narcissistic hedonism, and 
then by various psychological sequences derives ersatz versions of love, 
benevolence, and altruism. To invent such hypothetical trains of thought 
and feeling may be an interesting parlor game, but it is far from axiom-
atic that any such psychological process actually takes place in human 
development—empirical research suggests that in fact it does not. What 
will happen to literary criticism when it recognizes the patriarchal taboo 
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